Overview

Sanctions on the International Criminal Court

Executive Order 14203, signed on February 6, 2025, and titled "Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court," imposes sanctions against the ICC based in The Hague, Netherlands. The order includes visa restrictions and financial penalties for people who help the ICC investigate U.S. citizens and U.S. allies. Trump declared such ICC actions an "unusual and extraordinary threat" to U.S. national security and foreign policy.

The executive order specifically cited the court's issuance of arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for war crimes committed in Gaza, as well as an ongoing investigation into possible abuses committed by foreign forces in Afghanistan, including U.S. military and intelligence personnel. ICC judges found reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant had intentionally and knowingly deprived the civilian population in Gaza of objects indispensable to their survival, including food, water, and medicine, from at least October 8, 2023 through May 20, 2024, when the prosecutor filed applications for arrest warrants. It was the first instance in the court's 22-year history that it had issued arrest warrants for Western-allied senior officials.

Trump's order was issued during the week Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was in Washington, and makes clear that his administration sought to shield U.S. and Israeli officials from accountability before the court. The White House accused the ICC of having "abused its power" by issuing the arrest warrants and of engaging in "illegitimate" actions against the U.S. and its close ally Israel. The Trump administration maintained that the court lacks the authority to investigate or prosecute citizens of countries that have not consented to its jurisdiction.

During Trump's first term, he imposed sanctions against then-ICC Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda and one of her associates as punishment for investigating possible U.S. war crimes in Afghanistan. The 2025 executive order is similar to that earlier action, which was subsequently lifted by President Biden. The second-term order, however, proved broader in scope and more aggressively implemented.

Significance and Impact

In February 2025, the Treasury Department sanctioned then-ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan. The administration later sanctioned Francesca Albanese, the UN Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territories, and in September 2025 designated three Palestinian human rights organizations — Al-Haq, Al Mezan Center for Human Rights, and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights — under its sanctions framework. In December 2025, the administration imposed sanctions on two more ICC judges over their involvement in the court's case against Israel, with Secretary of State Rubio designating ICC judge Gocha Lordkipanidze from Georgia and Erdenebalsuren Damdin from Mongolia, stating they had directly engaged in ICC efforts to investigate, arrest, detain, or prosecute Israeli nationals without Israel's consent.

The ICC faced significant operational challenges as a result of the sanctions, including Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan losing access to his email and having his bank accounts frozen. U.S. staffers at the court in The Hague were told they would risk arrest if they returned to the United States. These practical disruptions went beyond symbolic pressure, impeding the court's capacity to conduct its ordinary work.

The sanctions also chilled the work of civil society organizations that interact with the ICC. Human rights organizations reported that the sanctions had forced them to limit work involving the ICC and individuals and organizations targeted by the administration. The executive order's reach extended to anyone deemed to have assisted ICC investigations, creating legal exposure for lawyers, researchers, and advocacy groups engaged in international accountability work.

Reactions and Debate

Trump's action was met with immediate expressions of support for the court from around the globe. Seventy-nine ICC member countries issued a statement reaffirming their "unwavering support" for the court, highlighting how sanctions could undermine the court's mandate, and committing to ensure the court could continue its work. UN experts strongly condemned the move, calling it "an attack on global rule of law" that undermines international justice.

Legal challenges materialized quickly and multiplied. In April 2025, two human rights advocates sued over sanctions against then-ICC Prosecutor Karim Khan, arguing that the restrictions violated their First Amendment rights. A federal judge found the advocates were likely to succeed on their constitutional claims and issued a preliminary injunction protecting their communications with the court. In June 2025, three sanctioned ICC judges — Judges Kimberly Prost of Canada, Solomy Bossa of Uganda, and Reine Alapini-Gansou of Benin — filed suit against the Trump administration, arguing that the president's order directly violated the Administrative Procedure Act, which prohibits the government from making arbitrary and capricious policy changes.

According to attorneys involved in the litigation, the February 2025 executive order essentially re-instituted the sanctions attempted under the first Trump administration. A permanent injunction was successfully obtained protecting certain plaintiffs from enforcement. Other litigants allege that the sanctions exceed the president's authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and infringe rights under the First and Fifth Amendments and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.

On August 11, 2026, four human rights groups — the American Friends Service Committee, the Center for Constitutional Rights, Human Rights Watch, and the Open Society Institute — filed a lawsuit in U.S. federal court challenging the Trump administration's sanctions against ICC prosecutors and judges, a UN human rights expert, and three Palestinian human rights groups. The lawsuit added to a growing stack of litigation that courts have not yet fully resolved.

The political debate within the United States was less clear-cut than the international response. The U.S. House of Representatives passed legislation on January 9, 2025 to allow sanctions targeting the ICC, but on January 28, 2025, the Senate voted against moving the bill forward — suggesting that even Congress was divided before Trump acted unilaterally through executive order. The order was nonetheless lauded by some top Democrats as well as Republicans.

Outlook

The sanctions regime against the ICC remains in force as of August 2026, though its enforcement has been constrained in some respects by federal courts. The litigation landscape is complex and unresolved: federal courts in New York and Maine found the executive order violated the First Amendment and temporarily or permanently stopped enforcement of the sanctions regime against specific plaintiffs in those cases, but the executive order itself has not been struck down in its entirety, and the administration has continued to designate new individuals and organizations under its authority.

The episode raises durable questions about the limits of executive power in foreign affairs and the use of economic sanctions as a tool of legal coercion. The sanctions regime, and the executive order on which it is based, undermines access to justice for victims of serious international crimes and prevents civil society from working together to combat impunity, according to the groups that have challenged it. The administration, for its part, has maintained that protecting U.S. personnel and allies from prosecutorial overreach by an unaccountable international body is a core national security interest.

The broader international consequences are also significant. The U.S. campaign against the ICC — combined with the Gaza conflict and questions about the court's jurisdiction over non-member states — has intensified a debate among ICC member governments about whether and how the court can function under sustained pressure from a major power. Whether allied governments will deepen their support for the court's independence, or quietly accommodate U.S. pressure, remains an open question that will shape the institution's credibility and effectiveness for years to come.